Recent scholarship has uncovered convincing evidence of systematic donor influence in IFIs such as the World Bank. Less clear is how donors influence IFI decision. Possible avenues are formal and informal (Woods 2003) : formal influence through official decisions of the board of executive directors and informal influence over decisions not made at the board level. This paper explores the role of informal influence at the World Bank by examining the flow of funds after loans are approved. Controlling for commitments (loan approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the geopolitical interests of important donors? Since the board of executive directors is formally involved in loan approval but not in disbursement decisions, this provides an interesting case to identify the avenues of influence. The results indicate the scope of reforms needed to bolster the independence of the World Bank.
I.

Introduction
There is a well-established literature looking at the influence of donors on the behavior of international financial institutions (IFIs). Considerable attention has been focused on the IMF (e.g., Andersen, Harr and Tarp, 2006; Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher et al., 2009B; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Stone, 2000 Stone, , 2004 Thacker, 1999) but studies of the political economy of IFI lending cover other institutions as well, including the World Bank. For example, Dreher et al. (2009A) find that the number of World Bank projects approved is higher when the borrowing country is a rotating member of the UN Security Council than when the country is not, ceteris paribus. Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006) Somewhat less well studied are the pathways through which donors exert influence in IFIs.
In the case of the IMF, Stone (2004) provides a convincing story regarding program interruptions.
When countries fail to meet lending conditions, Fund staff members suspend programs, apparently with little regard to geopolitics. The board of executive directors then reviews cases to see if the program should be reinstated. Stone finds that reinstatements happen more expeditiously for geopolitically important countries. This work provides evidence of formal influence as board decisions appear to reflect the interests of powerful countries. Dreher et al. (2009A) suggest two routes at the World Bank. First, staff may anticipate donor preferences and bring forward more project proposals for favored countries (i.e., informal influence). Second, the board may simply act more quickly on such projects (formal influence).
In general, studies of loan decisions (e.g., using commitment data) reflect the combined effect Aid agencies and governments typically commit funds before they disburse them. In the 1 case of the World Bank, commitments are IDA credit amounts and IBRD loan amounts approved by the Board of Directors. These are counted in full at the time the Board approves the loan/credit. Disbursements are counted at the time the World Bank actually pays out funds, e.g., when a program loan tranche is released or a project expense reimbursed. For program loans, disbursements usually happen over a one to three year period after loan approval (but longer delays are possible); for project loans, a six year disbursement profile is typical. Committed amounts may not fully disburse if loan conditions are not fully satisfied, a project is completed under budget, the project/program is cancelled, or the loan is cancelled. 2 of formal and informal influence but cannot distinguish between them, fundamentally because the details of executive board decisions are not public record. It is possible, however, to assess informal influence in other settings. For example, Kilby (2009A) looks at disbursements of World Bank adjustment loans, controlling for commitments. That study finds that World Bank structural 1 adjustment loan disbursements are less dependent on macroeconomic performance in countries aligned with the United States. Because the decision to release a loan tranche is not officially made by the board, this presents evidence of informal U.S. influence over Bank operations.
Apart from that study, previous work on the World Bank has examined behavior that at least in part reflects formal influence. This is clear for studies based on commitment data which directly reflect loan approval decisions made by the board (e.g., Andersen, Hansen and Markussen, 2006) but it also applies to most studies using disbursement data since the level of disbursements depend on the level of prior commitments. For example, Fleck and Kilby (2006) find a link between U.S.
interests and World Bank disbursements. This link could be driven, at least in part, by the role U.S.
interests play in the formal process of loan approval by the board. The U.S. executive director could vote for and lobby other countries to support loans that further U.S. interests. Such efforts would result in more commitments which in turn result in more disbursements.
This paper looks at World Bank disbursements after controlling for commitments. If donor influence over the flow of funds is largely confined to board approval of projects and thus commitments, subsequent geopolitical events (UN voting, military alignments, etc.) should have no influence on the flow of these committed funds from the Bank to the borrower. Following this logic, proxies for donor interests should prove insignificant in a regression of World Bank disbursements that includes commitments as a control variable. In this scenario, Bank staff make disbursement decisions free from donor pressure. Alternatively, donor influence could extend more deeply so that donor priorities influence disbursement decisions over which the donor has no formal control. Kilby (2009A) finds patterns consistent with U.S. influence in disbursement decisions in the case of World Bank adjustment lending; the question is whether donor operational influence is more widespread.
Understanding how donors influence IFI decisions, whether via formal channels, informal channels or both, is critical for successful institutional reforms. If donor influence is largely formal, governance reform at the board level is the appropriate solution. But changing the governance structure (e.g., voting shares, majority requirements, etc.) may be a much less potent approach if donors have significant informal influence. In this case, the key factors may be the location of the institution, hiring and promotion practices, information disclosure, and linking performance and pay in the appropriate fashion. The location of the Bretton Woods institutions just blocks from the White House clearly facilitates informal U.S. control of the institution. A lot has been written about hiring and promotion practices and the dominance of U.S.-educated professionals within the Bank. These characteristics insure the U.S. government good access to information regardless of official disclosure policies so that World Bank disclosure restrictions merely hinder others from providing a check to U.S. informal influence. With pay and promotions not closely tied to project outcomes, Bank staff have little incentive to resist informal pressures that may reduce project performance.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops a framework for examining the influence of donors on post-approval allocation decisions. Section III presents and describes the data used in the analysis. Section IV discusses the estimation procedure and results. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II. Model
I start by examining the World Bank's allocation of funds at the project or program level. I divide the opportunities for donors to influence World Bank allocation decisions into two periods:
up through loan approval and post-approval. Up through loan approval, donors may accelerate the process and expand loan size when they wish to use access to World Bank funds to reward countries.
Conversely, donors may slow the process and reduce loan size when they wish to limit access to World Bank funds to punish countries. At this stage, donor influence can be exercised through formal or informal channels. After loan approval, donors may pressure the Bank to disburse funds expeditiously, ignoring potential problems (corruption, lack of counterpart funding, failure to reach benchmarks 
where for appropriately defined X. The hypothesis that donors influence disbursement rates is equivalent to for appropriately defined DI while the alternative hypothesis that donors do not influence disbursement rates implies . Taking logs of both sides and rearranging yields
Data on planned disbursements (d ) are not systematically available but data on commitments are.
* ij
Define c = World Bank commitments to country i for project j (i.e., the World Bank loan amount).
Assuming a standard disbursement profile by project type and "age" (years since the project was ij ijt approved), we can use c to proxy for d if we control for project type (e.g., with a sector dummy * This does not assume that loans are designed to disburse in the year they are approved; rather 2 planned disbursement could extend over several years. This contrasts with the link assumed between commitments and disbursements in Hamann (2003, 2007) , Celasun and Walliser (2008), and Odedokun (2003) . 
III. Data
The data used in this analysis are described in Table 1 sample size is constant for any given equation. Results are the same without this restriction. I also limit the sample to countries that are members of the World Bank in the applicable year; information on their year of entry ("signing date"), exit ("withdrawal date") and re-entry ("return date") comes from the World Bank web site. Thus, the selection equation does not include selection into or out of Bank membership. The disbursement rate equations (that include original commitments as an independent variable- Tables 2 and 3 plus Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4 ) also restrict the sample to cases where original commitments are positive, i.e., where disbursements are possible.
I use older IDS CD-ROM data to fill-in missing values in new data, effectively recovering 8 countries dropped from OECD coverage (especially from 2007 and on). This is necessary because IDS data are not historical in the sense that the DAC "updates" its data to the current situation. For example, when two countries unite, the two country time series are combined into one and henceforth only available in the combined format even over the period before the countries united. When a country splinters, DAC data are divided accordingly, again even back through the period when only one country existed. When a country is dropped from DAC coverage (e.g., in 2007 when CEECs/NICs were dropped as no longer "developing"), the historical data for those countries disappear. so that measures can be constructed for the other G7 countries. Early State Department reports have some limitations (not distinguishing between abstentions and absences, inconsistencies between different tables). Where possible, I used original documents reproduced in these reports rather than the report tables generated from those documents. However, discrepancies were minimal. major conflict with at least 1000 war-related deaths in that year, the case in almost six percent of the sample.
The variable diffUSA is the difference between a borrowing country's alignment with the U.S.
on important UN votes and its alignment with the U.S. on "unimportant" UN votes; diffG7 the equivalent measure for alignment with the other G7 countries. The voting alignment calculation is the same as in Kilby (2006 and closely follows Thacker (1999) To avoid log of zero and thereby shrinking the sample, I add 0.01 to each bilateral aid value 14 when taking logs. This figure ($10,000 or !4.065 in log terms) is the lowest positive disbursement level reported in the raw data. This results in 270 changes for the U.S., 4 changes for the other G7, and 54 changes for the like-minded donors. Results are not sensitive to the choice of the "trivial" value. Alternatively, using binary variables throughout for bilateral aid gives roughly the same results for UN variables as reported in the tables below. Egypt's support in the first Gulf War. At this time, Japan was emerging as the largest aid donor. In a related move, the OECD DAC temporarily changed its rules to allow write-offs of military aid loans to count toward individual donor's development assistance totals, mainly benefitting the U.S. (Raffer, 1998) The next largest figure is $4.8 billion for Panama in 1999, again driven by flexible definitions of aid (this time related to the hand over of the canal zone). Next is $3.7 billion for Poland in 1991 and $2.7 billion for Egypt in 1988. Note that Israel is excluded from the sample because it did not borrow from the World Bank during this period. These anomalous cases again underscore the merits of a log specification.
Because there are so few cases with no G7 aid, I also estimated the eligibility equation with 
IV. Estimation and Results
We can think of the World Bank disbursement decision as happening in two steps. First, World Bank staff decide whether a country is eligible for disbursements. Second, if it is eligible, the staff decide how much to disburse. To allow for this approach, I estimate a two part model with separately estimated selection/eligibility and conditional allocation equations. This has the I also estimate a Heckman Selection Model following the specifications in Table 2 Column 18 4 (selection) and Table 3 Column 4 (allocation) but with regional dummies rather than country fixed effects. This improves identification because I use bilateral aid variables as dummies in the selection equation and as continuous variables in the allocation equation. The estimate yields results very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . Furthermore, a Likelihood Ratio test fails to reject the hypothesis of independent error terms (p = 0.6221), i.e., the hypothesis that the two part model is correct.
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limitation that interpretation of the allocation equation is conditional on selection-unless we are willing to assume the error terms in the two equations are independent. However, it also has certain benefits relative to alternative estimation techniques. A Type I Tobit, for example, requires same process for selection and allocation, an assumption that we will see does not hold well in this case.
In addition, that approach would rule out use of country fixed effects. The number of countries (N) is greater than the number of time periods (T) so consistent estimation of country fixed effects in not possible for estimators that cannot be transformed to eliminate the country fixed effects. A Type II Tobit (Heckman Selection Model) has similar limitations. There are no theory-based exclusion restrictions for the selection equation so identification would rest either on ad hoc, empirically based exclusions or the nonlinearities of the probit function. In addition, introducing fixed effects in this context (say, through a conditional logit as the selection equation) would cause the 77 countries that always get funding to drop from the sample (since their country fixed effect would perfectly predict the selection outcome), reducing the sample by more than half and likely introducing an even more severe selection problem.
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Is there informal influence? Table 2 presents results of probit estimation of the selection/eligibility equation using the full sample described in Table 1A . The estimated equation fits the form of equation (4) in the probability of receiving aid. The probably of receiving disbursements also increases with country size while it decreases with per capita income, both outcome one would expect from a needbased eligibility system. Freer, more democratic countries are not significantly more likely to receive disbursements (individually or jointly) and although an on-going war is associated with a lower probability of receiving aid, this link is also not statistically significant. The UN voting variable, however, is significant. Countries making concessions to the U.S. on important UN votes are significantly more likely to receive funding from the World Bank. Moving from the lowest value to the highest value of diffUSA increases the estimated probability by 25 percentage points, a larger impact than moving between the extremes of population (16 percentage point change) or GDP (18 percentage point change). In this baseline, however, diffUSA captures both pre-and post-loan approval U.S. influence (conditional on positive original commitments) so we cannot yet interpret this as evidence of informal influence.
Column 2 of Table 2 introduces controls for the level of commitments (ln_original_commitments plus portfolio age and composition variables). As one would expect, the original commitment variable enters with a positive and significant coefficient indicating that countries with larger active portfolios are more likely to receive disbursements from the World Bank.
At the sample mean, a one percent increase in original commitments corresponds to about an equal increase in the probability of disbursement while going from the lowest level of original commitments to the highest results in an 80 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of disbursement. The age profile of commitments enters the equation non-linearly with predicted probability of disbursement first increasing up to 4 years, then decreasing. Going from the highest (at four years) to the lowest (at nine years) lowers the predicted probability of disbursement by 22
percentage points. Of the other portfolio composition variables, only the number of technical assistance projects (ta_count) enters with a statistically significant estimated coefficient in the selection equation. Starting from the sample mean, one addition technical assistance project increases the predicted probability of disbursement by half a percentage point. Going from no technical assistance projects to 17 (the sample maximum) increases the predicted probability of disbursement by two percentage points.
With commitment portfolio controls included, we now can interpret the estimated coefficients on other variables as plausibly measuring the impact of post-approval events. As expected, this leads to some substantial changes in the estimated coefficients. Conditioning on their commitment portfolio, blend countries are not significantly more likely to receive disbursements than countries whose commitments are either all IDA credits or all IBRD loans. The estimated coefficient for population reverses sign so that, conditional on their commitment portfolio, larger countries are less likely to receive disbursements. Poorer countries are still more likely to receive disbursements though the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is reduced by half.
Finally, the diffUSA coefficient now can be interpreted as measuring U.S. influence after loan approval, i.e., informal influence only. As one would expect, the estimated impact is smaller but it remains positive and statistically significant. Again going from the lowest value to the highest value I also investigated trade variables but found no statistically significant links in either the 19 selection or allocation equations. I omit these variables here in the interest of brevity.
Note that the impact of introducing LM_elig is fully consistent with it capturing need 20 factors: ln_gdp ceases to be significant. Also, the estimated coefficient on USA_elig is 20 to 30 percent larger if LM_elig is not included.
of diffUSA, the estimated probability of disbursement increases by 6.5 percentage points.
Column 3 of Table 3 presents results for the allocation equation, estimated with country fixed effect.
Country fixed effects allow for time-invariant, country-specific factors that influence the level of disbursements (Column 1) or the rate of disbursement (Columns 2-4) and therefore reduce the potential for omitted variables bias. The structure of the table is the same as for Table 2 but dependent variable is the log of disbursements (as in equation (4)), the sample is restricted to cases with positive disbursements, and the results should be interpreted as conditional on selection unless we make additional assumptions. Also, I use continuous variables for bilateral aid though results
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do not depend greatly on this.
Column 1 of Table 3 again presents a baseline without commitment portfolio controls. The significant estimated coefficient for blend indicates countries that receive disbursements get
As one might expect, the critical difference is between no SALs and some SALs since 23 whether an adjustment program is packaged as one economy-wide program or several simultaneous sectoral programs depends mostly on internal World Bank politics (i.e., introducing SECALs as "something new" when initial SALs fail to improve macroeconomic performance). The coefficients on other variables are the same whether I use a dichotomous or count variable so I leave the count version in for symmetry with the other categories (where count variables are appropriate).
20 significantly more than their normal level when they have both IDA and IBRD commitments. That population and GDP per capita are not statistically significant in this fixed effects specification is unsurprising since these variables generally are slow moving. In contrast to their role in the eligibility equation, both the Freedom House and the Polity indices are significant. When a country is more free than its norm, it receives significantly more disbursements when eligible. Conversely, when a country is more democratic than its norm, it receives significantly fewer disbursements when eligible. Here, the implied ceteris paribus assumption is crucial as polity becomes positive (though insignificant) if FH is omitted. Disbursement are significantly below normal when a country is engaged in a major conflict, an outcome that could reflect either the difficulty of operating under such conditions or government priorities. The UN voting variable enters with a large and significant positive coefficient. When they get disbursements, countries get greater-than-usual disbursements if they made greater-than-usual concessions to the U.S. in UN voting, ceteris paribus.
Column 2 of Table 3 includes the commitment portfolio controls. As one would expect, the amount of original commitments has tremendous explanatory power for disbursements. In keeping with equation (4), the estimated coefficient for ln_original_commitments is not significantly different from 1; this is true across all allocation equations in which it is included. The disbursement rate peaks when age_amt reaches 2.5 years and portfolios with more Structural Adjustment Loans disburse more quickly, ceteris paribus.
The remaining coefficients are reduced in magnitude but with signs and significance as before. The exception is the blend dummy; the disbursement rate is not significantly faster for countries that can draw on both IDA and IBRD resources. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on diffUSA is reduced by nearly two thirds but remains positive and significant, evidence consistent with U.S. informal influence after loan approval.
The specifications in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 parallel those in Table 2 . The estimated coefficient for diffUSA changes little from Column 2, remaining positive and statistically significant.
Of the other variables introduced, only ln_LM_tofg (bilateral aid from like-minded donors intended to proxy for need) enters with a statistically significant estimated coefficient. The other U.S. interest variables are not statistically significant in Column 3; this persists even if diffUSA is dropped (even if country fixed effects are omitted). In Column 4, the G7 interest variables also prove statistically insignificant.
Taken collectively, these results provide convincing evident of informal U.S. influence in the World Bank after loan approval. That influence is reflected in the significance of a UN voting measure that is consistent with a vote buying model. In short, countries are more likely to have their World Bank loans disbursed and disbursed quickly if they make concessions to the U.S. on UN votes that matter to the U.S.
Comparing influence before and after loan approval
How important is post-approval, informal influence compared to the influence donors exert within the World Bank up through loan approval? Table 4 presents a series of estimations to shed some light on this question. These estimates differ in terms of the specification, the sample and the The first column in each group (Columns 1 and 4) repeats the final specifications in Tables 2 and   3 but does not report the commitment portfolio variables as these variables are excluded from the other specifications in Column 1 of Table 4 is the disbursement eligibility equation that includes (unreported) commitment portfolio variables and hence is restricted to the sample where original commitments are positive. As outlined above, this specification estimates the probability of disbursement conditional on commitments. Column 2 of Table 4 has the same dependent variable but omits commitment portfolio variables. In addition, the sample includes observations where the country was a member of the World Bank but had no active loans, i.e., no commitments that could have been disbursed. Thus, this disbursement eligibility equation actually reflects a combination of decisions -current and past loan approval decisions and current loan disbursement conditions. Finally, Column 3 is the selection equation for current commitments (loan approval decisions) so that, in a rough sense, Column 3 may explain differences between Columns 1 and 2.
As an example of this, consider population. Column 1 shows that larger countries are less likely to receive disbursements conditional on commitments but Column 2 shows that larger countries actually more likely to get disbursements overall. The apparent contradiction is explained by the commitment selection equation which shows that larger countries are more likely to get commitments. This is easiest to understand with a simple example. Suppose there are 10 large countries and 10 small countries. Since large countries are more likely to get loans approved (Column 3), say that 8 large countries and 4 small countries get loans approved. Since small countries with approved loans are more likely to get disbursements (Column 1), say that 3 of the 4 small countries get disbursements and 4 of the 8 large countries get disbursements. The end result is also consistent with unconditional result of Column 2; overall, the large countries were more likely to get disbursements (4/10 v. 3/10).
This suggests that we can compare the sign, significance and magnitude of coefficient estimates across Columns 1 and 3 to understand how informal donor influence in the post-approval disbursement process compares with the mix of formal and informal influence in the period up through approval. If these differ in kind, we can see which effect dominates in terms of its influence on the overall disbursement probability (Column 2).
Looking first at UN voting, diffUSA plays a similar role in the two settings, entering with a positive and significant coefficient in all three columns. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is highest in Column 1 (looking just at informal influence post-approval) and lowest in Column 3 (looking at formal and informal influence up through approval). The voting variable for the other G7 is not significant in any of the three selection equations. U.S. military aid is a significant covariate at the commitment stage but is not an important determinant of the conditional probability of disbursement subsequently. The link between receiving U.S. economic aid and receiving World Bank funds is stronger at the commitment stage (statistically significant in Column 3) though of the same sign and magnitude at the disbursement stage (not statistically significant in Column 1).
Receiving G7 aid is a significant covariate only at the disbursement stage. These results persist if
Combined with the earlier results, this means that receiving significant U.S. military aid is 25 associated with improved changes of getting a World Bank loan but not a significantly larger loan or a significantly higher probability the loan will disburse or significantly faster disbursement of that loan if it is disbursing.
US aid is statistically significant in Columns 5 and 6 if we lag the bilateral aid variables 26 though the coefficient is relatively small.
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the bilateral aid variables are lagged one year (i.e., the results are not obviously driven by reverse causation).
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 are the disbursement rate equation (conditioning on the commitment portfolio), the disbursement allocation equation (not conditioning on commitments), the commitment or loan allocation equation. As with the selection equations, the estimated coefficient on the U.S. UN vote variable is larger post-approval (Column 4) than it is earlier (Column 6). Again, the voting variable for the other G7 is not significant in any of the three equations. U.S. military aid is an insignificant factor across all three allocation equations. The 25 level of US bilateral aid is also not a significant covariate. The results for G7 aid are difficult to 26 explain -marginally significant and negatively related to the commitment amount (Column 6) but significant and positively related to the disbursement amount (Column 5). This would make sense if the disbursement rate were particularly high but the coefficient estimate in Column 4 is neither large nor statistically significant.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that informal donor influence in the post-approval period is at least comparable to the combined formal/informal donor influence exercise up through loan approval. This is particularly true in the case of the U.S. using access to World Bank funds to buy UN votes.
V. Conclusions
Efforts to reform international financial institutions to better serve their efficiency-promoting goals depend critically on understanding the functioning of these institutions in their current forms.
Recent reform efforts focus on governance changes that may reduce the formal influence of the U.S.
and other historically powerful nations. Less reform attention-and indeed less research attention-has been devoted to the avenues through which informal influence operates. Indeed, the relative importance of formal and informal influence is not well understood. With such gaps in our knowledge, it is impossible to say how effective governance reform is likely to be at changing the actually functioning of an institution.
This paper picks apart the avenues through which donors influence the World Bank, focusing on informal influence over disbursement of loans that have already been formally approved. In this setting, I find quantitatively and statistically substantial links between UN voting and World Bank disbursements, primarily reflecting U.S. informal influence. A comparison with donor influence over the loan approval process suggests that informal donor influence has at least as much impact on the allocation of World Bank resources as formal donor influence. This finding means that reform efforts should go well beyond a simple reallocation of voting shares, reaching deeper into the workings of the institution to change the fundamental structure of how "business gets done" at the World Bank. 
